6. Public goods (+ public bads) (2016)

Apunte Inglés
Universidad Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Grado Economía - 3º curso
Asignatura Public Sector Economics
Año del apunte 2016
Páginas 6
Fecha de subida 18/04/2016
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6. PUBLIC GOODS (+ PUBLIC BADS) “Private goods” xR + xF = X ––> “Rival Consumption” (Rivalry) + “Excludability”.
Pareto-Efficient Condition MVR(xR) = MVF(xF) = MC (xR + xF) –> MRSRx,y = MRSFx,y = MRTx,y –> Institutional Framework –> Px “Public goods” Non-rival consumption (non-rivalry) + non-excludability.
Pareto-Efficient Condition “National Defense” MVR (Y*) + MVF (Y*) = MC (Y*) MRSRxR,y = MRSFxF,y = MRTx,y max UR (xR , Y) xR,xF,Y s.t. UF (xF,Y)=UF F (XR + XF, Y) = 0 There are infinitely ways to achieve the point we want. Robinson could pay 3 and Friday 6, 2 and 7, 4 and 5, etc. But, with the particular distribution which every one pay an amount equal to their marginal valuation of the good at point Y*, they will agree providing Y*. F.e. 3,6.
MVR (Y*) + MVF (Y*) = MC (Y*) f (Y) = MC (Y) Lindahl Prices P*R = MVR(Y*) P*F = MVF (Y*) UNANIMITY P*R - ε = 3 - ε P*F + ε = 6 ε YR = Y F = Y The marginal valuation for the good could be very different. But, with Lindahl prices, we can assure that the provision of the public good will conduct to a Pareto-improvement: both will prefer Y* than 0. Lindahl prices provide a reasonable benchmark in the provision of the public good.
Lindahl Prices Assume that MC is constant.
PF = αc PR = (1-α)c P*R = α*c P*F = (1-α*)c Lindahl prices This only works if there is a truthful revelation of preferences. But individuals prefer to not reveal it, so they can save their money. This is known as the “free ride” problem. This is not incentive compatible to reveal your preferences. So, market mechanism and unanimity will be inefficient.
Will the provision of public goods throw majority voting be consistent with an efficient provision of public goods? - Can we assure existence of a majority notion? Yes? Ok. No? Bad luck. Under certain circumstances, we can assure exist a majority notion, but not always.
- If yes, will it be Pareto-efficient? No in general, but… Example: We assume three groups of people with the following preferences.
- I “Bored boring” (muermos): A > B > C - II “Middle of the way”: B > A > C - II “Exalted”: C > B > A With individuals voting their preference action, no majority will be achieved. Let’s consider the “Robin-round vote” (todos contra todos).
Alternative B is preferred to any other.
A B B C I II I III III II Median Voter Theorem (D. Black) If: - Unidimensional issue.
- Odd number of individuals (voters).
- Preferences are “single peaked” (there are at least and no more than one peak).
Then, there will always exist a majority motion, and it will coincide with the maximum preference of the median voter.
When will not exist a majority? - I “Bored boring” (muermos): A > C > B - II “Middle of the way”: B > A > C A B I II III - II “Exalted”: C > B > A Cycling. No majority motion.
B C C A II I III I III II - Three individuals (A, B, C).
- One public good (or bad) to be elucidated.
- Key assumption: the fiscal system is exogenous (ta, tb, tc). Individual preferences concerning the public good are single-peaked. (ta + tb + tc = MC constant).
Theorem (Bowen) If: - Each individual pays the same “tax price” for the public good. (MC=c; ti=c/3).
- There is a symmetric distribution if individual preferences (median=mean).
1/HMC = tmedian = MVmedian = MVmean = 1/H ∑ MV hypothesis median voter theorem hypothesis definition ∑MV = MC Then, the majority rule will lead to the Paretoefficient level of Y.
If kurtosis is not 0 (the distribution is symmetric), the Bowen theorem will not work, so the majority voting will not be Pareto-efficient.
With two public goods (n public goods) can we ensure existence of a majority motion? No.
- Separate votes: You choose one input a forget the other in one vote, and the other way round in another.
–> (Y1, _); (_, Y2): This conduct to a no cycling result.
The amount of Y1 will be the maximum preference of the medium voter of input Y1, and the same for Y2.
–> (Y1/Y2): First, individuals choose the preferred ratio between Y1 and Y2. Here, B is the medium voter, so his line will be the chosen.
Then, they choose the amount they prefer. B will choose point B. A and C will choose the more closed point to A and C, so the medium voter amount of every input separately will be the amount of Y1 and Y2 decided.
Theorem (Plott) Under certain conditions (stringent), cycling will not be the outcome. This condition say that if the maximum preference of one of individuals lay on the political bilateral contract curve between the other two, there will be no cycling.
Collective consumption of private goods For example education or health services. They are rival, so they are private goods, but and consume collectively, and in the same amount.
∑Hh=1 Zh = Z Z1 = … = Zh = ZH => Zmine· H = Z MV1 (X1) = … = MVH (XH) = MC (X1 + … + XH) (Private) MV1 (Y) + … + MVH (Y) = MC (Y) => ∑MVh(Y) = MC (Y) (Public) (Private goods collectively consumed) => ∑ MVh (Zmine) = H· MC (Zmine) = 1/H ∑ MVh (Zmine) = MC (Zmine) Is N/2 optimal? K/N is the optimal. N/2 is inclusive in K/N? The optimal inclusivity will be the one that minimize the cost in the voting procedure. If unanimity is required, the cost of the voting procedure could be infinite. So, we have to decide what is the optimal inclusivity point.
We have to take into account the decision-making (CD-M) costs and the inefficiency costs (CI).
Buchan + Tullock (The Calculus of Consent) –> “Public Choice” –> an economic theory of politics.
min C (N) = CDM (N) + CI (N) K* => MCDM (K*) = - MCI (K*) Social choice “a (mathematical) economic theory of voting results.” Public choice (Buchanan + Tullock) “an economic theory of Politics.” Individuals are not political eunuchs.